The present article aims only to make public a kind of research project “in motion.” For many years, I have been indicating the importance of the distinction between objective inference (or illation) and subjective inference (or illation) in the works of Garrigou-Lagrange (used also in the writings of his one-time colleague Reginald Schultes). Primarily, but not exclusively, in my translations and writing I have emphasized how important this is in the debates over dogmatic development. Regularly, we find him responding to Francisco Marín-Sola’s theories of dogmatic development by appealing to this distinction. In the present article, I would like to abstract from that debate, if only because I am very certain that the two men have different epistemologies and logical theories. Recently, while visiting the library at the Pontifical Faculty of the Immaculate Conception at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, DC, I had the pleasure of looking through Fr. William A. Wallace’s copy of the French edition of Fr. Marín-Sola’s work on dogmatic development. Throughout the first hundred pages, there are many places where he has placed a perplexed question mark next to various things that Fr. Marín-Sola says concerning the nature of reasoning and demonstration. Fr. Wallace was an expert in the Posterior Analytics, so I consider him a very important authority for considering these matters. But it also points to the fact that a complete account of the differences between Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange and Fr. Marín-Sola would require a massive study.
Before that study, however, I sense that there is another one to be done, namely an entire dissertation on the development of “subjective inference” in Garrigou-Lagrange and how it plays a very important, ubiquitous role in his oeuvre and in his very conception of the philosophical disciplines and discursive theology. At the end of the present study, I will gather together in a single place all of the references that my research assistant Nicholas Ramirez helped me to gather from across Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange’s works. My hope is that some intrepid graduate student might consider a dissertation on this topic. Obviously, such a project will begin with a careful engagement with the Posterior Analytics.1
For now, I wish to crystallize my own pedagogical thought. Several years ago I had to teach a logic course for which I really could not find a unified book to use. It was a very strange class, which received no credit. Therefore, I had to attempt to gather from multiple sources my own approach to these topics. Thus, I drew on Maritain, Woodbury, Smith, Houser, Oesterle, occasionally Kreeft, and various other sources (especially by trying to include matters of rhetoric and poetics, at least in brief). This also included a discussion of the question of objectively and subjectively illative syllogisms. Therefore, I will first present my own pedagogical summary. Then, I will lay out a number of Garrigou-Lagrange’s examples. Finally, I will summarize points regarding why this is an important topic.
Pedagogical Summary
Per se predication (cf. Woodbury, Logic, 299ff). Classically, one distinguishes between four modes of predicating per se: when a definition or its part is predicated; when a property or its genus is predicated; the way that one speaks of a substance (and hence not a particular mode of predication); the predication of a proper efficient causality. Thus, as we see, classic modes 1, 2, and 4 are the most important as modes of predication, and they will be our focus here.
It is important to recognize that this question of per se predication indicates a reason why the matter of propositions is important, not merely the form of syllogisms. This is very easily seen if we consider how such per se predication affects the convertibility of propositions, as will be operative below. Note, also, that in two of these modes, we will indicate a primary and a secondary sense. The primary sense will be possible when we can convert the proposition in question; the secondary will be when we cannot.
Mode 1. In this case, we predicate a definition, or part of the definition, of its subject. Thus: Every man is a rational animal. So too, every rational animal is a man. This direct A-statement to A-statement convertibility is only possible because of the matter that is affirmed in the judgment (in contrast to the mere form every X is Y). However, it is also an essential (per se) predication to predicate a genus that is part of the definition of a thing. Thus: Every man is an animal. This is 1st mode per se “secundo.” Notice, in this case, the matter of the judgment prevents us from converting directly to an A statement. In other words, you can’t switch the subject and predicate and say: “Every animal is a man.” At most you can convert to an I statement: Some animal is a man. However, this is a standard conversion form that is not unique to such 1st mode per se secundo propositions. Nonetheless, this kind of secondary predication is still important because we are saying something essential when we say that man is an animal.
Mode 2. In this case, we predicate a property of a subject. Here again we have the case of convertibility being primary. Thus: Every man is a political being ⬄ every political being is a man; every man is discursively volitional ⬄ every discursively volitional being is a man. In this mode there is also a secondary sense, when a property flowing from the genus of the subject is predicated. Here, let’s consider something taken from mathematics: an isosceles triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. You see, this is a property of triangles as such, not isosceles triangles. But, it still tells us something that is deeply connected to an isosceles triangle’s principles, albeit the proper principles of its genus, triangle.2 Notice that you cannot convert these secondary predications either. (Merely having three angles equal to two right angles does not mean that you have an isosceles triangle.)
Mode 4. Here, the predicate is the proper effect of the subject: the sculptor, qua sculptor, makes a statue; God, uniquely as God, is creator ex nihilo; the final judgment of the practical intellect is the (extrinsic-formal) cause of the will in moral choices. Here, there is no distinction through convertibility.
Scientific reasoning (according to the Posterior Analytics) is centered upon arguments that make this kind of predication, ultimately, in light of first principles within a given order of knowledge. This is why it is important to know something about per se predication. Much more can be said, but this will suffice for some of the cataloging that I do below.
We can furthermore distinguish the kinds of syllogism as such:
Proper syllogism (called “objectively inferential / illative”), when a new truth is deduced in the conclusion.
An improper syllogism, when there is no such new truth, though there are two different sorts of such improper syllogisms:
Explicative (called “subjectively inferential / illative”), when the conclusion only states more explicitly what is contained in the premises. A very important point: In point of fact, this presupposes the significant work of defining,3 which is a very underappreciated portion of logic, namely the logic of terms and the logic of analogical ordering. This sort of syllogizing represents a kind of “stabilizing” of our knowledge, in order to manifest to us a given, better definition.
Expository syllogisms, which set forth merely a kind of example. They are not inferential / illative in any way.
More on each type of syllogism. An expository syllogism uses a singular (NB: singular, not merely particular) term as its middle. It issues in a kind of representation or exposition of something, not an inference. Thus: Judas betrayed Christ. But Judas was an apostle. Therefore, an apostle betrayed Christ. The middle term (Judas) is singular, and there is no passage from one truth to another. For more details on this syllogistic form, especially its valid figures and moods, see Maritain’s work on logic.4
An objectively illative syllogism involves a conclusion that does something more than merely explicate the middle term of the syllogism. Therefore, it pertains to those syllogisms that involve per se predication according to the second and fourth modes of perseity (property and proper causality).5 This is above all the work of discursive science as a habit enabling the drawing of new conclusions in light of one’s principles.6 It would seem arguable that such illation takes place very frequently in the process of dialectical inventio—in poetics and rhetoric too. Here is the clearest case of knowledge that passes from what is more known to what was less known or unknown.
However, there is also the case of a syllogism in a form where the conclusion only restates more explicitly what is in the premises. Woodbury (Logic, no. 300) says that in such syllogisms, the conclusion states more explicitly what is in the major. Using bold for the major term and underline for the minor term, leaving the middle unchanged, consider his example: “Man is mortal; but a rational animal is a man; therefore, a rational animal is mortal.” He also notes that the same mode of per se predication must be preserved in the conclusion. Truth be told, looking at the later examples from Garrigou-Lagrange, I feel that much more consideration must be given to these sorts of syllogisms. The importance that Garrigou-Lagrange gives them in philosophy and theology will be noted at the end of the present essay.
Examples of Objective and Subjective Inference Taken from Garrigou-Lagrange
In what follows, I have attempted to reproduce the arguments offered by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, though at times making modifications in order to give some shape to the argument in question. However, I have not put them in complete categorical form. A complete, dissertation-length engagement with these texts would require careful treatment of each argument in order to lay out its content, modality, per se character, etc. very carefully. Therefore, the reader should recognize that my own interpretation is present for each of these texts and should, therefore, consult the original as well. I have taken these from the Latin, the editions of which will be cited at the end of this essay. In the syllogisms I use bold for the major term and underline for the minor term in the conclusion and in the premises.
It should be noted that Garrigou himself regularly makes the point that objective inference takes place when something is contained as a property in an essence or as an effect in a cause (and, hence, I would add, for modes 2 and 4 per se), whereas subjective inference takes place when something is contained as the implicit in the explicit, a part in a whole, or a singular in a universal (cf. De Deo uno, 42–45; De Deo trino, 315; De virtutibus, 90–94; et aliis locis).
Important: all of these interpretations are open to critique, nuance, etc. The present article comes from preparatory work done for a brief (15-minute) conference paper at the 2026 ACPA Conference in Washington, DC.
Examples of properly and objectively inferential syllogisms
Objectively inferential example 1
Major: To-be (esse) follows upon person; or, to put it another way, where there is one person there is one substantial existence.
Minor: Now, in Christ, there is one person.
Conclusion: Therefore, in Christ there is one to-be. (De Deo uno, 46).
Here, esse is not a part of the definition. It is being treated as a per se property of personhood (at least for Garrigou-Lagrange, who, unlike Billot et al., does not hold that personality-subsistence is formally constituted by esse). Premise 2 is De fide. However, the conclusion enunciates a new truth, indicating esse treated as a property or effect of personhood. The major term is predicated as a property.
Objectively inferential example 2
Major: Every man can acquire knowledge (scientiam) from experience and observation.
Minor: Now, Christ was a true man.
Conclusion: Therefore, Christ had acquired knowledge (scientiam).
“Can acquire knowledge (scientiam) from experience and observation” is a metaphysical property of man, indicating something different from rational, though as a proper effect. To be rational is to be able to acquire knowledge in this way. But this is not part of the definition of rational animal. Premise 2 is de fide. Conclusion indicates a property. Perhaps it could be known elsewhere in revelation; however, here, it is a new truth not contained in the definition of man. (De Deo uno, 45). The major term is predicated as a property.
Objectively inferential example 3
Major: Infused knowledge (scientia) is necessary so that the human intellect might not remain imperfect but, rather, might know, for example, various languages that are not naturally known. (Reworked: Infused knowledge would give perfection to a human intellect on earth.)
Minor: Now, Christ’s human intellect on earth could not remain imperfect.
Conclusion: Therefore, Christ’s human intellect already on earth had infused knowledge (scientia). (De Deo uno, 46; cf. De Christo Salvatore, 265–6).
Depending on one’s perspective, the major is either a case of a property (infused knowledge being a property of perfect knowledge) or, as when reworked above, it indicates that infused knowledge would be a per se cause of the effect of having a perfect intellect. (It would not be the only such per se cause, admittedly. But it would seem to be convertible with this as cause and effect. Therefore, perhaps the property attribution is best?) Thus, the major term is predicated as a property or proper cause. (It is possible, moreover, that this whole syllogism could be reworked into a form in which Christ’s perfection of knowledge is a cause of His infused knowledge).
Objectively inferential example 4
In any event, he also explicitly uses per se attribution of cause-effect for this same conclusion:
Minor: It is fitting that Christ would have had, like His Apostles, the gift of tongues.
Major: Now, the gift of tongues presupposes (as an effect presupposes its per se cause) infused knowledge.
Conclusion: Therefore, Christ had infused knowledge.
I am maintaining the sense of “fittingness” perhaps implied by convenit. Still, it seems that the argument is attempting to make a per se claim, on the basis of cause-effect. Here the major term seems to be predicated as a per se cause. Hence, Christ’s perfect knowledge is caused, at least in part but in a per se way, by infused knowledge.
Objectively inferential example 5
Major: If action and passion are no longer applied to motion, all that remains is the relation of effect to its agent-cause.
Minor: Now, creation, presupposing as it does no subject, takes place without motion and change.
Conclusion: Therefore, creation in the creature (i.e., “passive creation”) is only a kind of relation to its cause (i.e., the Creator). (De Deo trino, 255).
Here, admittedly, a little more interpretation might be necessary. It would seem that here we have the sole relation of effect to cause as the effect of uncreated action of God in creation. (Note well that this is the limit case of the predicaments of action and passion, for in fact the action—“active creation”—in question is the Divine Nature. And, the action is indeed wholly in the passion / patient, except the sense of action that is in the patient is not like in hylomorphic causes, where the actualization-action is only in the patient. Instead, all that remains is the notion of complete dependence of the created upon the uncreated. That is, active creation does not become anything in passive creation.) The major term seems to be the effect of the middle term (change that is not motion).
Objectively inferential example 6 (two de fide premises)
(An example taken from St. Athanasius of Alexandria. Garrigou-Lagrange holds, in his theory of development, that such inferences from two de fide premises can be defined.7)
Major: Only God deifies (i.e., makes gods by participation through grace).
Minor: Now, the Word of God deifies us.
Conclusion: Therefore, He is God (and hence homoousios with the Father). (De Deo trino, 41–42).
Presupposed in the major and minor is a relationship of proper cause to proper effect. The final conclusion is understood as a new truth that is not merely an explication of the definition of another term. Thus, it represents a true movement of knowledge. The major term is the cause of the middle (to deify).
Objectively inferential example 7
Example with a natural premise, but with a conclusion that is elsewhere revealed
Major: Every man is free.
Minor: Now Christ is a true man.
Conclusion: Therefore, Christ has freedom (i.e., is free). (De Deo uno, 45; De virtutibus, 91).
Freedom would be a metaphysical property of man. It is a property of rational animal but does not declare the same thing as rational animal. Therefore, to say that Christ has freedom is to say something more than he is a true man. However, as Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange notes, this conclusion is known from elsewhere in Scripture. The major term is the property of the middle and, thereby, of the minor term.
Examples of explicative or subjectively inferential / illative discourse
Subjectively inferential example 1
Minor: It has been revealed that Christ is true God and true man.
Major: Now, a rational soul is essentially required for true humanity.
Conclusion: Therefore, Christ had a rational soul. (De Deo uno, 45; De virtutibus, 91).
Here, “to have a rational soul” is taken as an even more explicit sense of “to be a rational animal”. In this regard, therefore, what we have is the major term being the definition of the middle term. The conclusion is a more explicit statement of the minor.
Subjectively inferential example 2
Minor: Christ established Peter as the unfailing foundation of the teaching Church.
Major: Now, one established as unfailing foundation of the teaching Church must be infallible in whatever ways that is needed for handing on the doctrine of salvation.
Conclusion: Therefore, Christ gave Peter infallibility as needed for handing on the doctrine of salvation. (De virtutibus, 94)
The form here could use some work, but the general point to note here is that the major term is a more explicit definition of the middle term. The conclusion is a more explicit statement of the minor.
Subjectively inferential example 3
Minor: In the notion of mission there is implied a twofold relation of the one sent, to the one sending and to the term to which he is sent.
Major: [Such a twofold relation can belong to a divine person.]
Conclusion: Therefore mission can belong to a divine person, analogically and properly… (De Deo trino, 208–9).
Here, the major term is a more explicit definition of the sense of the minor term (i.e., as a relation of sender-sent between divine persons).
Subjectively inferential example 4
Minor: The things said of God (such as procession) are to be understood according to the likeness (of procession as found in) intellectual substances, not bodies.
Major: Now, procession in intellectual things is according to an action ad intra.
Conclusion: Therefore, the procession that is said to be in God is a procession ad intra. (De Deo trino, 55).
The major term is a definition of the middle. That is, it only declares what procession is in intellectual beings. The conclusion is a more explicit statement of the minor.
Subjectively inferential example 5
(From Scripture, we know that Christ gave His successors the power to remit or retain sin.) Now, the power to remit or retain by way of judgment is a power whose exercise requires distinct knowledge of the sins judged. Therefore, Christ gave his successors a power that necessarily requires individual and distinct knowledge of the sins being remitted or retained. (De eucharistia, 384).
Reworked into better categorical form:
Minor: The power Christ conferred on the Apostles and their successors is the power to remit or retain sins by way of judgment.
Major: The power to remit or retain sins by way of judgment is a power whose exercise requires distinct knowledge of the sins judged.
Conclusion: The power Christ conferred on the Apostles and their successors is a power to remit or retain sins by way of judgment, whose exercise requires distinct knowledge of the sins judged.
This argument requires some work to get into form. However, it would seem that his argument here is that the major only spells out the definition of remitting or retaining a sin by way of judgment. He does not present this as a property. Thus, it would be like this: the power of remitting or retaining sins = (is defined as) the power of remitting or retaining those sinful acts that are manifested distinctly. Thus, the conclusion would state more explicitly restates the minor.
Subjectively inferential example 6
Next, we have the following syllogism, reworked from a very passing remark (De Deo uno, 437n1):
Minor: God is the one who works in created agents both the willing and the working, for His good pleasure.
Major: The one who works in created agents both the willing and the working is one whose decrees concerning those acts are of themselves infallibly efficacious — because God wills, not because man wills.
Conclusion: God is one whose decrees concerning our salutary acts are of themselves infallibly efficacious — because God wills, not because man wills.
Thus, according to him, the essential definition of “one who works in created agents both the willing and the working” is more explicitly expressed by the major term “one whose decrees concerning those acts are of themselves infallibly efficacious — because God wills, not because man wills.” Thus, the conclusion only states more explicitly what is found in the minor.
Subjectively inferential example 7
(The following required significant reworking.)
Minor: Peter is the rock upon whom the Church will be built.
Major: To be this rock is to be an unshaken cause—and thus infallible—where one’s essential office of jurisdiction requires such infallibility.
Conclusion: Therefore, Peter is one having such infallibility. (De eucharistia, 44 and 108; De Deo uno, 44; De virtutibus, 91).
As noted above, this example required significant reworking, in view of the relatively passing examples that he provides. For him, the notion of infallibility seems to be of the essential definition, not a property. Along similar lines to what we have seen earlier, the conclusion states more explicitly what is in the minor.
Subjectively inferential example 8
Major: Good and being are converted. (Implied, because good is had if and only if it is being: hence, non-good and non-being are converted. Therefore, that which is non-good is non-being.)
Minor: Evil is opposed to good (is a non-good).
Conclusion: Therefore, evil is not something positive but, rather, is negative because it is a kind of non-being (technically as privation, but that seems to go further than this argument, which only reaches that it is negative). (De Deo trino, 315)
The major term is a more explicit form of the middle “is non-good”. However, it should be noted that technically the reasoning does imply a first step, regarding properties: good is like a property of being; a non-good is a non-being; evil is a non-good; evil is a non-being. In this form, the minor is technically an explication which has something of the notion of a property, not a definition (the convertibility of the transcendentals implying the reality of the other transcendentals but not knowledge of them). This would seem to imply that, in point of fact, the conclusion implies some growth in knowledge.8
Subjectively inferential example 9—Possibly inferential?
Major: The production of the whole being of a given thing is from no being (just as the production of man is from non-man).
Minor: Now, creation is the production of the whole being of a given thing.
Conclusion: Therefore, creation is the production of a given thing from no being, that is, ex nihilo. (De Deo trino, 249).
Along similar lines to what we have seen earlier, the conclusion states more explicitly what is in the minor.
Subjectively inferential example 10
Garrigou-Lagrange (following Thomas) makes the following argument in a kind of backward form, in order to show that Augustine’s formula for the virtue of faith implicitly contains the later, more explicit form. Reversing the form, we get the rather anodyne application of a definition:
Minor: To believe is to think (or ponder) [cogitare] with assent.
Major: This kind of assent is to firmly adhere to revealed truth, with knowledge that is not perfect through manifested vision of the truth.
Conclusion: Therefore, to believe is to firmly adhere to revealed truth, with knowledge that is not perfect through manifested vision of the truth.
Along similar lines to what we have seen earlier, the conclusion states more explicitly what is in the minor.
Subjectively inferential example 11—Likely expository
Major: Presupposing monotheism [i.e., “God” is only one substance (broadly speaking, though not as in a category)]: The Word, the only-begotten Son, is God (i.e., this One “Substance”).
Minor: The Father is God (i.e., this One “Substance”).
Conclusion: The Word-Son is one with the Father precisely from the perspective of “this one God-substance,” that is, as consubstantial. (De Deo trino, 41).
Garrigou-Lagrange presents this as though it is explicating, though in fact, this seems to be expository in form (see opening discussion above). Of course, one must be very careful with such a demonstration, lest one fall into a kind of modalism. Garrigou-Lagrange avoids this by adding further precisions, some of which I have reflected above.
Subjectively inferential example 12
He numbers this as one of three arguments intertwined in a series of subjectively illative proofs in Thomas. This syllogism could probably use some further unpacking and work. But this is the form that he presents (De virtutibus, 174):
Minor: Faith, since it is a habit, must be defined through its proper act in relation to its proper object (=is defined through the object of the act of believing).
Major: Now, the act of believing (=the object of the act of believing), inasmuch as it is not concerned with that which is seen, is an act of the intellect determined to one thing by the command of the will.
Conclusion: Therefore, the habit of faith must be defined through an order to the object of the will (to the good or end, being said to be the substance of things hoped for) and through an order to the intellect (to the true, being said to be an argument that does not appear).
Thus, if we concede the more complexly articulated conclusion as being a further explication of the major, we here have the major being a more explicit form of the middle (reading this middle as “the act of believing, that is, knowledge of that which is not seen”). Through this, along similar lines to what we have seen earlier, the conclusion states more explicitly what is in the minor.
Subjectively inferential example 13
In De Christo Salvatore, 528–9, we find what seems to be the following argumentation presented as a case of a part in a whole relationship:
Minor: Mary is perfectly associated with Christ’s victory over Satan.9
Major: Victory over Satan involves victory over sin, concupiscence, and death.
Conclusion: Therefore, Mary is victorious in a way that includes victory over death [at least in the form of an Assumption connected to her Dormition, as Christ rose from the dead.]
Effectively, this argument involves the more explicit stating of the parts of the definition of “victory over Satan”. Therefore, the conclusion only states more explicitly what is found in the minor.
Subjectively inferential example 14—singular contained in a universal
Major: All men sinned in Adam.
Minor: Abraham was a man.
Conclusion: Therefore, Abraham sinned in Adam. (De Deo uno, 45).
Sinned in Adam is contained as a singular in the universal, non-exceptive, all men. It would seem that in this case, we have an example of the categorical form of an “immediate inference” (noting that it is not to a particular but to a singular), which is in fact not an inference of a new truth.10 He also gives the example that Christ died for all men, including the mother of God.
A final observation
He also points out in passing that there are many such explicative syllogisms happening throughout the treatises he is commenting on, sometimes indicating that multiple questions are nothing more than this (see De eucharistia, 130, 187, 189; De Deo trino, 54; De Christo Salvatore, 22). Technically, also, he will at times speak of how the immediate grasping of a per accidens sensible like substance is prior to any illative discourse (cf. De Deo uno, 103, et aliis locis), but this is not of direct interest here.
Why Does He Think this is an Important Distinction?
This distinction between objective and subjective inference, found all throughout Garrigou-Lagrange’s works, plays a very important role for what he thinks about the very nature of philosophical and theological reasoning. Allow me to summarize these points of importance thus:
Because disciplines that can be called sapientia or wisdom are above all concerned with their principles, one of their primary tasks will be to explicate their principles.11 Although this is done through defining, such explication can also use the explicative syllogism to lay out such principles, both in theology (Thomistic Common Sense, 232; On Divine Revelation, 97; “Theology and the Life of Faith,” 267–7, 277, 284) and in philosophy (Thomistic Common Sense, 260, 276–7, etc.; On Divine Revelation, 468; The Order of Things, 52–3; The Essence and Topicality of Thomism, 35).
Such definitional labor and the subjective inference that manifests it is, in fact, the primary part of theological labor. He repeats this in many places. One finds forms of the assertion in many of the texts I have translated (e.g., “Theology and the Life of Faith”). I was particularly struck by this in his De eucharistia (e.g. 45, 46, 125, 187). He also repeatedly makes clear that the structure of the Summa reflects this, thus showing the centrality of de fide truth in Thomas’s argumentation. See De Deo trino, 52, 54; De eucharistia, 187; “Theology and the Life of Faith,” 276–7.
It is very important for his theory of dogmatic development. See “Theology and the Life of Faith,” 284. In particular, for a good and detailed summary of his thought on this (present in other texts above—e.g., De revelatione, “Theology and the Life of Faith,” other places in the De Deo uno, De Deo trino, De Christo Salvatore, De eucharistia cited much above), see De virtutibus theologicis, 90–94. Indeed, what he says about the importance of definition in this process (in section 3 of Thomistic Common Sense) implies, also, this syllogistic theory of subjective inference. For some other relevant texts: De Deo uno, 42–9; De Deo trino, 41–2, 54, 249, 250; De eucharistia, 106, 384–386; De Christo Salvatore, 529; On Divine Revelation, 96–100, 320–327.
Moreover, because of the role of definition involved in this process, it would be useful to take what he has to say about the process of definition12 and to expand it by considering the way that dialectic often plays an important role in the discovery of definitions.13
One point of interest is his position regarding the use of objective inference from two de fide propositions. In this case, he follows the Salmanticenses (Cursus theologicus, de Fide, disp. 1, dub. 4, no. 127 and surrounding discussion). Any full treatment of this topic in his thought will require a consideration of this theme. He cites this on several occasions (De Deo uno, 43ff; On Divine Revelation, 99–100; in passing in Reality; et aliis locis). This point is of great importance for precision concerning the debate over the definability of theological conclusions.
I find it interesting that although Garrigou-Lagrange clearly is distinguishing the modes of per se predication, he never quite says it explicitly. I’m not sure that I’ve seen him provide a citation to the Posterior Analytics or to a later Thomist’s logical work when drawing the distinction between objective and subjective inference. Nonetheless, because of the way that he distinguishes between those predications which are causal or property-wise (as objectively inferential) and those which involve only definitional explication (as subjectively inferential), it seems clear to me that he is drawing upon this distinction from scientific material logic. It would be interesting to consider all of this with greater philosophical exactness. Even if this same distinction is handled in some philosophical authors, nonetheless, it is not deployed commonly and therefore deserves greater development and more explicit codification in Thomists’ treatments of scientific material logic. Indeed, the present case in Garrigou-Lagrange shows how theology births philosophical reflection without fully handling all of the properly philosophical investigations necessary. Therefore, this theme in him is an eminent example of a kind of Christian philosophy roused by theological reasoning.14
This list only begins to scratch the surface on why he thinks that this point of logic is of such importance for understanding what makes theology a unique form of wisdom. In a way, it anchors the theological enterprise to the common experience of faith, for it shows how theological labor first and foremost serves the data of faith. I also believe that it confirms what he teaches concerning the common-sense origin of philosophical reasoning, for if intellectus and synderesis are the habits of first principles belonging to all, then the primary sapiential tasks of philosophy will include this same sort of deployment of non-inferential syllogizing as part of the work of articulating the common patrimony of what is not, in itself, philosophical.15
As I have already said, the present article intends to invite further work of precision and, I would hope, a monograph-length dissertation by some eager student!
Editions Cited Above
De Christo Salvatore. Turin: R. Berruti, 1945.
De Deo uno. Turin: Marietti, 1938.
De Deo trino et creatore. Turin: Marietti, 1943.
De eucharistia et de poenitentia. Turin: R. Berruti, 1943.
De virtutibus theologicis. Turin: R. Berruti, 1949.
Thomistic Common Sense. Translated by Matthew K. Minerd. Emmaus Academic, 2021.
On Divine Revelation. 2 Vols. Translated by Matthew K. Minerd. Emmaus Academic, 2022.
“Theology and the Life of Faith.” In The Thomistic Response to the Nouvelle Théologie. Edited and Translated by Jon Kirwan and Matthew K. Minerd. The Catholic University of America Press, 2023.
The Order of Things: The Realism of the Principle of Finality. Translated by Matthew K. Minerd. Emmaus Academic, 2020
The Essence and Topicality of Thomism. Translated by Alan Aversa. 2013.16
On this point, I highly respect the work of Dr. Daniel Wagner, whose dissertation from the Center for Thomistic Studies is, I believe, under consideration for publication.↩︎
I am here setting aside the important distinction between metaphysical and physical properties, the latter being a real accident consequent upon an essence and the former being the essence itself as foundation for such a property. For some indications, search for these terms in Matthew K. Minerd, “From Unity to Distinction to Unity: A Recovery of the Vocabulary of Various Mental Distinctions,” To Be a Thomist, https://www.athomist.com/articles/from-unity-to-distinction-to-unity-a-recovery-of-the-vocabulary-of-various-mental-distinctions.↩︎
See Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, “On the Search for Definitions According to Aristotle and St. Thomas,” Philosophizing in Faith: Essays on the Beginning and End of Wisdom, ed. and trans. Matthew K. Minerd (Providence, RI: Cluny Media, 2019), 21–34. This is a regular theme throughout his works, however, which should be consulted on the whole. His direct defense of metaphysical principles in works like God: His Existence and His Nature, On Divine Revelation, The Realism of the Principle of Finality, and Thomistic Common Sense involves this sort of explication of terms. Another example: the passage from a common notion of the human soul to the explicit sense in the Council of Vienne (cf. De Deo trino, 250). Also, the notions of nature, person, substance, Incarnation, Eucharist, conversion, real presence, etc. (cf. De eucharistia, 125). He notes the great difficulty of the process of defining, sometimes taking centuries (De virtutibus, 94).↩︎
See Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Logic, trans. Imelda Choquette (London: Sheed and Ward, 1946), 211, 233–235, 270.↩︎
Some, such as Marín-Sola, seem to hold that the predication of per se mode 2 is also something like an explicative syllogism. However, as noted above, this involves a new truth.↩︎
For a discussion of science and wisdom, see Matthew K. Minerd, “Wisdom Be Attentive: The Noetic Structure of Sapiential Knowledge,” Nova et Vetera 18, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 1103–1146.↩︎
He takes this from the Salmanticenses. I will note references below.↩︎
This issue regarding the transcendentals is why I have had to speak of an “illatively-explicated minor conceptual distinction” in which objective illation is necessary to lay out the relations among properties (whether metaphysical properties, divine names, or some of the transcendentals). See Matthew K. Minerd, “From Unity to Distinction to Unity: A Recovery of the Vocabulary of Various Mental Distinctions,” To Be a Thomist, https://www.athomist.com/articles/from-unity-to-distinction-to-unity-a-recovery-of-the-vocabulary-of-various-mental-distinctions.↩︎
This, rather than the divine maternity, is proposed as being a more proximate reason for the Assumption.↩︎
See Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Logic, 234–5.↩︎
On the various tasks of wisdom that he speaks of, see note 6 above.↩︎
See note 3 above.↩︎
See W.A. De Pater, Les Topiques d'Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne, méthodologie de la définition (Fribourg: St-Paul, 1965). However, one should consult also the works of Pelletier as an important counterweight to certain claims made by De Pater concerning dialectic. See the works gathered in the bibliography at the bottom of https://www.athomist.com/articles/introduction-to-dialectical-logic.↩︎
For his position on this topic, see Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, “On the Relationship between Philosophy
and Religion,” Philosophizing in Faith: Essays on the Beginning and End of Wisdom, ed. and
trans. Matthew K. Minerd (Providence, RI: Cluny Media, 2019), 361–398. His position is substantively the same as Maritain’s.↩︎
Obviously, such articulation itself falls under a light that is discursive and, therefore, has a unique mode of articulating its experience (in terms of truths that explain and truths that are explained). However, one article cannot do everything. For more on this, I recommend Michel Labourdette, “Theology: Faith Seeking Understanding” in The Thomistic Response to the Nouvelle Théologie, ed. and trans. Matthew K. Minerd and Jon Kirwan (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press), 89–126.↩︎
AI (Claude) was used for copy editing of this file and for organizing some notes gathered together by the human labor of my research assistant, Nicholas Ramirez.↩︎
