A Noetic Taxonomy of Discursive Wisdom
For some time, I have intended to draft an initial organization of the various kinds of assent operative within sapiential disciplines—that is, within the philosophical disciplines and within discursive supernatural theology. I first articulated several divisions of such judgments, especially those proper to strictly sapiential knowledge, in an article published in Nova et Vetera (English Edition), “Wisdom Be Attentive: The Noetic Structure of Sapiential Knowledge.” Subsequent reflection on the nature of theological argumentation has introduced further nuances beyond what was taken into account in that article. Of particular importance was a course on twentieth-century Thomism that I taught one summer at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, during which I was struck by certain late-life refinements in the thought of Garrigou-Lagrange, especially as presented in Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought.1 This sensitivity was further sharpened while co-directing a thesis on the work of Marie-Rosaire Gagnebet, written by Fr. Robert Nesbit, OSB, also at the University of St. Thomas. Alongside this work, I have undertaken sustained reading concerning the De locis theologicis,2 which raised parallel questions concerning these matters. Finally—and most decisively—I led a seminar for the Lyceum Institute devoted to the overall structure of dialectical logic in the broadly Aristotelian tradition. In light of the conceptual gains from these experiences, I now judge that I am in a position to offer a synthetic sketch of my present thinking in a public forum.
Although I remain convinced that a clearer distinction must be drawn between science and wisdom, the purpose of this essay is more modest. It seeks only to catalogue a certain organization of sapiential knowledge that I habitually presuppose when thinking about these matters. The schema proposed here is not intended to be definitive or normative for others, though I do hold that much of what is presented rests on a solid foundation. My sole aim is to render my own thinking explicit and structurally articulated.
It should also be noted that this taxonomy is somewhat static in character. Nevertheless, where there is a kind of terminal teleology oriented toward a more definitive state of judgment, I will attempt to indicate this within the taxonomy itself.
Pre-Scientific Judgments in Sapiential Discourse
Doubt. At times, one may consider a range of possible positions without possessing firm assent to any particular option under consideration. Such doubt can arise with respect to immediate principles, scientific conclusions, or even the concrete application of either. In a state of doubt, the mind does not yet assent; nevertheless, insofar as doubt is situated within sapiential discourse, the mind is already set in motion. Through dialectical probing and dialogue—both interpersonal and through engagement with authoritative minds, living and dead—it begins to seek possible arguments in favor of a given position. Very often, doubt at the level of common sense passes over into a scientific-sapiential mode through the wonder thus aroused. The mind seeks out the principles of things and the conclusions that can be drawn in light of them. Once one has crossed this threshold, one is leaving common sense for a discipline that truly seeks to be oriented by the principles of reality.
Authoritative credibility or belief. Within a given sapiential domain, one may arrive at a state of assent grounded in the recognized authority of another, thus believing through an argument from credibility. Such assent rests upon the trustworthiness of the witness rather than upon the intrinsic reasons for the position itself. The motives for such credibility can be various. As an act of credibility, one does indeed possess reasons for trusting an authority; yet this credibility is also accompanied by what may be called “reasons of the heart,” namely, affective inclinations toward the goodness of the assent—either because the content is objectively good, or at least because truth itself is the proper good of the intellect.
In theological discourse, this mode of assent underlies the deference accorded to the Fathers and the great theologians of the tradition, as well as to other figures presented as authoritative by the uniquely authoritative Church. Such authoritative belief plays a crucial role at the outset of any dialectical process. In theological matters, the De locis theologicis (and positive theology) is uniquely concerned with articulating the logic governing the use of such authorities. Revealed authorities and ecclesial authority occupy a central—though not exclusive—place in theology, while a sound history of intellectual culture, marked by recognized authorities and living teachers, serves as a particular guide for the philosopher. When we believe, we do not yet possess intrinsic evidence for what is held; consequently, belief naturally gives rise to a desire to “see,” at least insofar as this is possible through immediate insight or argument. In the act of belief, the will is engaged both through freedom of specification and through freedom of exercise, sustaining assent amid difficulties. This, in turn, presupposes an especially important role for docility as a moral disposition.
In supernatural matters, it is essential to recall that such belief is not merely a form of rational credibility—whereby one accepts the announcement of revealed truth because it is reasonable to heed a given authority—but is, above all, belief grounded in the supernatural credibility of God Himself, the Triune First Truth revealing both Himself and the redemptive economy. Consequently, supernatural belief intrinsically presupposes the work of grace.
Suspicion, conjecture, and hypothesis. In the midst of dialectical reasoning, the mind probes possible common arguments for a given position. This can give rise to a slight motive for holding one possible truth over another, which may be described as suspicion. More frequently, however, it involves conjecture or the formation of a hypothesis—something proposed for consideration and testing within the question-and-response process proper to dialectical logic. Here, too, the mind is gradually oriented toward a state of definitive acquisition, insofar as such acquisition is possible. This orientation entails a movement toward either a direct per se attribution or, at least, the discovery of a per se demonstration, whether quia or propter quid. In the course of this process, it becomes evident that the mind is also actively deploying the first operation of the intellect, especially in its effort to clarify definitions. Thus, one seeks to pass from merely accidental or descriptive definitions to those that are increasingly proper and, where possible, essential. In such cases, the will appears to remain engaged both through freedom of exercise and freedom of specification. Moreover, reasoning by likeness—what may be called poetic logic—plays an important role here, as do certain forms of rhetorical suggestion. Character, too, is especially significant at this stage, lest one become lost in curiosities or drift into vain imaginings.
Probable certainty. Whenever arguments grounded in common, non-per se principles enable the mind to judge that one position is more likely true than its alternatives, the mind has entered the domain of probable certainty. This marks a significant advance, for probable certainty genuinely inclines the intellect toward a determinate truth. It can be properly understood only within the overall dynamism of the intellect as it seeks to articulate a definitive judgment, insofar as this is possible, or at least to attain the highest degree of discursively argued certainty available in the case of a given contingent truth. Such contingency may be objective, as in the case of contingent facts, or subjective, as when a per se nota truth is not yet fully known.
At this stage, probable certainty continues to involve the will, though now only with respect to freedom of exercise. The absence of per se evidence—whether immediate or mediated—can give rise to a kind of intellectual fear, prompting one to withdraw from assent even in the presence of strong and genuinely probable arguments. From this retreat, nihilism or negative skepticism may emerge, as the will settles into a habitual state of doubt rather than sustained probable certainty. Alternatively, one may lapse into a kind of lassitude amid the vigorous labor of dialectical reasoning, failing to press onward in the effort to determine the truth. In such cases, a truncated form of negative skepticism results: one concedes that truth is possible, but only to a limited degree, never as something definitively attainable. Thus, for such a person, the dicendum quod is a kind of awesome and fearful claim, seemingly arrogant in its pretentions.
All of the labor described thus far belongs properly to the via inventionis, wherein one seeks the discovery of truth within a given discipline. It is possible to arrive at a kind of terminal and seemingly absolute state of probability, in which it appears morally certain that a given position must be true, yet without a clear vision of the per se connection between subject and predicate. This constitutes a charged and decisive moment within dialectical discourse, as the mind stands poised for the emergence either of evident insight or of scientific inference.
Evident principial insight. This corresponds to what the Latin tradition has termed intellectus. Such knowledge involves evidence, that is, the direct sight of the immediate per se connection between the subject and predicate of a given proposition. This kind of insight can be attained within different disciplines according to their respective modes of abstraction—or, stated differently, according to their distinctive ways of defining terms. Because propositions of this sort, as it were, “stand on their own,” they are described as per se nota. This sense of per se must not be confused with another meaning of the term, namely, that an attribution concerns a predicate that belongs to a subject in a uniquely proper way. Following Woodbury’s interpretation of the Posterior Analytics, three principal modes of per se predication may be distinguished: when the predicate is involved in the essential definition of the subject; when the predicate is a property of the subject; and when the predicate is a proper effect of the subject. The first two modes admit further subdivision. In the first, the primary case consists in predicating the definition or specific difference of the subject, while the secondary case involves predicating the genus. In the second, the primary case consists in predicating a property that flows from the specific difference, while the secondary case involves predicating a property that flows from the genus.
Because the human intellect is neither angelic nor divine, such principial insight remains a genuine yet incomplete light. Consequently, the mind must proceed discursively in order to unfold more fully what is contained within these principles. From this need arises the generative source of both scientific and sapiential discourse, which seeks to penetrate the virtual and formal riches present within principial truths.
As should already be evident, even such evidential knowledge can be accompanied by difficulty, sometimes of a significant kind. This fact has given rise to an important distinction between truths that are per se nota to all and those that are per se nota only to “the wise.” This distinction is crucial for understanding the growth of human knowledge, even within the domain of first principles.
With respect to such principles, if one truly knows the terms involved, one cannot fail to grasp the truth itself. At most, one can turn one’s attention away from it—an act analogous to averting one’s gaze from a light that continues to shine.
Finally, it should be emphasized that much of this intellectual labor involves, as already noted, the work of definition. Here the mind is engaged in making careful distinctions among the meanings of terms, attending to equivocation, univocation, metaphor, and analogy. In the case of supernatural truths, the intellect likewise seeks—so far as this is possible—to illuminate for itself the supernatural meaning of the terms employed.
Scientific Judgments in Sapiential Discourse
Scientific demonstration, stated in general terms. When the mind draws a conclusion, it may do so on the basis of common principles applicable to any subject matter. Whenever this occurs, one is operating within the domain of dialectics, as described above. By contrast, when a conclusion is reached through an inference grounded in per se attribution, one enters the domain of science—at least insofar as such principles can ultimately be resolved into truly first principles that themselves stand in no need of demonstration. For example: all rational beings are moral beings; moral beings engage in political discourse; therefore, rational beings engage in political discourse. Broadly speaking, this form of reasoning is not merely based on common principles, but on per se attributions. In scientific discourse, dialectical logic aims ultimately at such per se attribution (they are one of the aims of dialectical logic, though laying outside of dialectics itself), while the scientific intellect labors to ensure that its demonstrations genuinely resolve to first principles. Because such reasoning proceeds through a middle term (in this case, “moral beings”), the conclusion is said to be known per aliud.
The state of science. It is important to recognize that a given scientific discourse may exist in a developing or imperfect state. This provides a kind of “global” context for understanding the scientific habit of mind. A learner, for example, may rely upon principles that he believes but does not yet truly know. A familiar illustration is the way many children learn mathematics: the procedural manipulation of mathematical operators without a grasp of the intrinsic truth of what is being done results in a deficient state of science. The scholastic notion of an imperfect state of virtue is an important tool for understanding this condition. Such an imperfect state—sometimes described as existing in habitu dispositionis or as being merely facile mobilis—lacks full stability and penetration. According to John of St. Thomas (and, I would add, according to the truth of the matter), something analogous occurs whenever scientific demonstration is attempted without a sufficiently developed grasp of logic. In such cases, scientific inference itself can be possessed only in an imperfect mode.
It is also crucial to recognize that theology exists in such an imperfect state for wayfarers, since we do not possess intrinsic evidence of revealed truths, but assent to them by faith. Nevertheless, because certainty belongs to the very essence of scientific knowledge, one can have genuinely scientific inference even when the premises are believed rather than known—provided that such belief enjoys unshakable certainty, as it does in matters of supernatural faith. The assent of belief, by its very nature, presses onward toward inquiry; yet inquiry does not of itself imply doubt. Hence supernatural faith gives rise to faith seeking understanding. As St. John Henry Newman famously observed, “Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt.”
Quia demonstrations. A quia demonstration occurs when one reasons, through discursively connected per se attributions, to the existence of a given fact—that is, to the affirmation that something exists. Such demonstrations typically proceed from effect to cause. Judgments of this sort are scientific in a qualified sense, yet they lack something of the full force proper to science in its strongest form. It is possible that quia demonstrations have played a particularly important role in the observational sciences, to such an extent that these sciences might be distinguished as scientific disciplines in their own right, rather than as mere parts of natural philosophy. This question, however, remains open.
Propter quid demonstrations. Such demonstrations proceed from cause to effect and thus provide genuine explanations. They recognize the full breadth of causality in its various modes and subdivisions: material; formal (including, for example, intrinsic, exemplar, objective, and signitive causes); efficient (including both immediate and instrumental causes); and final (including the finis cui, finis cuius, and finis quo). Demonstrations of this sort constitute science in its strongest sense. They are the proper labor of scientific reasoning. What follows will involve some further sub-distinctions related, above all, to propter quid demonstrations
An important distinction between two types of inference: subjective and objective. Subjective inference takes place through what are commonly called explicative syllogisms. In such syllogisms, the conclusion is, in itself, identical with the major premise; yet from our perspective (quoad nos) it is not identical, since it involves a more explicit re-expression of the terms. For a fuller treatment of this type of inference, one may consult Reginald Schultes, Garrigou-Lagrange, and several texts of the Salmanticenses. By contrast, an objectively inferential syllogism yields a conclusion that is genuinely new, in the sense that it articulates something contained only virtually in the premises and not formally expressed in either the major or the minor premise.
A hierarchy of objectively inferential syllogisms. It is here that the late-life developments of Garrigou-Lagrange are especially illuminating. Although the focus here will be on his treatment of theological knowledge, it seems likely that an analogous structure could be identified within philosophical knowledge as well.
One may (1) consider objectively inferential reasoning at the level of the principles of a discipline. Garrigou-Lagrange’s own example is drawn from revealed truths:
Again, theology uses reasoning, not merely explicative, but strictly and objectively illative to draw from two revealed truths a third truth, revealed elsewhere, often less explicitly, in Scripture and tradition. This kind of illative reasoning, frequent in theology, unites to the articles of the Creed other truths of faith, and thus forms a body of doctrine, with all constituent truths in mutual relation and subordination. This body of doctrine stands higher than all theological systems, higher even than theological science itself.
What is noteworthy here is that such reasoning does not introduce new truths extrinsic to the principles, but rather illuminates the body of revealed principles from within. It thus belongs to the doctrina fidei in the highest sense. It is on the border of science and wisdom (belonging more to the latter than to the former).
Such inference also involves—among other things—the articulation of the causal relations obtaining among revealed principles themselves: “The characteristic of demonstration is not necessarily to discover a new truth, but to make the truth known in its source, its cause. In this kind of reasoning we realize the full force of the classic definition of theology: faith seeking self-understanding. This realization is very important.” He is here influenced by Gagnebet’s work during the late-30s to early-50s.
(2) Next, there are cases in which a genuinely new conclusion is drawn on the basis of two revealed premises. Although such conclusions are objectively inferential, they remain sufficiently close to the deposit of faith that even the strictest Thomists have held that conclusions of this kind may be defined De fide:3
Theology uses reasoning, illative in the proper sense, to deduce from two revealed truths a third truth not revealed elsewhere, that is, not revealed in itself, but only in the other two truths of which it is the fruit. Thomists generally admit that such a conclusion, derived from two truths of faith, is substantially revealed, and hence can be defined as dogma. Reasoning enters here only to bring together two truths which of themselves suffice to make the third truth known. The knowledge of the third truth depends on the reasoning, not as cause, but only as condition.
To the degree that these first two kinds of demonstration remain within the domain of faith, there is already something sapiential about them.
(3) Finally, there are theological truths that are most distant from the revealed data and thus exhibit the most purely scientific character among such inferred conclusions. In this case, one draws upon non-revealed data in order to illuminate revealed truth, now by showing the virtual extension of revealed truth into matters wholly outside the deposit of faith, yet still capable of scientific articulation through per se structuring: “Lastly, from one truth of faith and one of reason, theology, by a process strictly illative, deduces a third truth. Such a truth, since it is not revealed simply and properly speaking (simpliciter): is revealed only virtually, that is, in its cause. A truth of this kind, strictly deduced, lies in the domain, not of faith, but of theological science.”
Sapiential Judgments
On the borders of science and wisdom. The reader should recall that, in the preceding discussion of scientific judgments in theology, two types of objectively illative syllogizing were identified that possess a genuinely sapiential character. (This recognition—drawn from Garrigou-Lagrange—represents an important development in my own thinking since the writing of “Wisdom Be Attentive.”) Nevertheless, insofar as such reasoning continues to yield objectively inferred conclusions, it also participates, to some extent, in the notion of science. Something analogous may be said of subjectively illative reasoning, at least insofar as it is applied to principial truths. The articulation of the noetics and logic governing these distinct yet overlapping modes of judgment constitutes an important task for both philosophy and theology.
Ordering of principles. Within a given discourse, there may be many evidential principles. It is a distinctly sapiential task to show how these principles are related to one another without thereby deducing them from one another. There is an ordering among principles, and the work of articulating this order does not primarily belong to science. Rather, it pertains to the kind of ordering that characterizes the wise person.
Defense of principles. One may argue on the basis of other truths held in common, conceding to an interlocutor the denial of a given principle while reasoning from truths that he or she continues to accept. Classically, this was the meaning of an ad hominem argument. Here, I am restricting this to a kind of actual defense of principles. In this style of argumentation, one can sometimes reason to one principle on the basis of another, accepted by one’s interlocutor. Much inter-confessional apologetics functions this way. Moreover, one might argue ad absurdum, which does not directly prove a truth but does extrinsically show that the denial of it leads to absurdities. This is very useful in philosophy. It also has a classic form in theology, which we could think of as a kind of reduction to heresy.
A further, more extrinsic kind of defense of principles. One may also defend principles by instrumentally employing another discipline in order to counter positions that purport to undermine the wisdom proper to a given domain. Thus, for example, the metaphysician may engage sufficiently in physico-mathematical science to demonstrate that an opponent’s position is internally untenable and that, for the sake of consistency within that science itself, it must be reconsidered.
In matters of faith, such reasoning can extend even to showing, on rational grounds, that arguments against the faith fail from the standpoint of reason itself. Thus, although one cannot prove the notion of subsistent relation as applied to the Trinity, one can show that nothing in the philosophical concept of relation is opposed to such an application. Likewise, while one cannot prove the intrinsic possibility of the beatific vision, one can demonstrate that it is not impossible.
Presentation of principles under a different motive of assent. This task has been developed most explicitly in connection with the notion of rational credibility. The theologian can show that the truths of faith are reasonable to hold, even when one has not yet crossed the threshold into supernatural belief. Something analogous occurs when the metaphysician shows the natural philosopher, the moral philosopher, and others that a given position is intelligible precisely in light of the truth and objective perspective proper to that other philosophical discipline.
Articulating the principles. Here the wise person deploys the full range of intellectual tools—poetics, rhetoric, dialectics, and scientific inference—in order to clarify for the intellect the meaning of the terms involved in first principles. One gathers together the sources of experience (or, in theology, the sources of faith and revelation) so as to bring about clearer manifestations of the definitions of the subject and predicate of a principle. Subjective illation may likewise be employed, as noted above. Moreover, by drawing not only upon the first mode of objective inference previously described, but also upon poetic likeness and rhetorical argumentation, one can point toward the ever-deeper penetration that remains possible with respect to a given principle. This task may well constitute the highest office of theological wisdom as discursive.
Elevating the mind beyond discursive wisdom to the immediacy of the principles. This refers to what I call the use of arguments from suitability or fittingness, which concern the intrinsic fittingness of a given truth rather than a merely defensive effort to reconcile it with a lower order of knowledge. Such argumentation is more properly probable in character and almost certainly involves poetics and rhetoric, especially a form of epideictic rhetoric. This mode of argument can be employed not only in theological contexts, but also within philosophy.
I believe that this represents an element of Platonic method that could fruitfully be reintegrated into philosophy. In supernatural matters, however, it takes on an even more decisive character, becoming a kind of passage from discursive theology toward the certitude proper to the beatific vision itself. (This claim is explicitly that of Garrigou-Lagrange.) Beyond even epideictic rhetoric, it is arguable that a kind of terminal moment of prayer—understood as an act of the practical intellect turning toward the Revealer and beseeching deeper knowledge of a given truth—may constitute a culminating moment within the very labor of discursive theology. Why? Because prayer itself makes a kind of assertion and thereby bears witness to the truth it seeks. It is this form of discourse that gives rise to the great liturgical poetry of the tradition, a genuinely theological act situated on the border between discursive theology and faith. Here, as in the case of certain forms of inferential reasoning and the development of dogma discussed above, poetic, rhetorical, and prayerful discourse reveals how discursive theology ultimately serves faith itself.4
Sophistical arguments. Finally, the wise practitioner of a discipline will also be capable of constructing sophistical arguments, precisely in order to identify and expose common sophistries. Such labor is not undertaken for destructive ends, but rather in service of the defense and clarification of the principles or conclusions proper to the discipline.
Concluding Remark
This taxonomy is by no means complete, nor settled, nor even expressed in the best articulation of which it may ultimately be capable. It represents, rather, a provisional synthesis—the present configuration of my thinking after many years of reflection, teaching, reading, and dialogue concerning the nature of assent in sapiential disciplines. Its purpose is not to foreclose further inquiry, but to render explicit a structure that has long guided my own judgment and practice. I hope that articulating it in this way will serve not only as an occasion of clarification for myself, but also as a point of orientation for others who are engaged in similar questions, whether by way of agreement, refinement, or fruitful disagreement.
One can search for “Steps in Theological Procedure” in order to find certain elements related to the content of the present article. In the translation, see Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, trans. Patrick Cummins (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder, 1950), 64–68.↩︎
Thus far, this has also given rise to two articles: “De Locis Theologicis: The Methodological Heritage 16th to 19th Century Scholasticism for the Use of Scripture and Exegesis in Theology” in Handbook of Biblical Thomism, ed. Matthew Levering, Piotr Roszak, and Jörgen Vijgen. (Edinburg, Scotland: T & T Clark, 2025), 163–181; “Sources of Revelation and Theology: Some Cartographic Observations of Jesuit and Jesuit-Adjacent Treatments of the De Locis Theologicis,” to be published in full form but now available in draft at https://www.athomist.com/articles/2025-jesuit-de-locis-paper.↩︎
In fact, it was this point that led Doronzo to abandon Schultes and Garrigou-Lagrange’s position regarding this question of defineability and agree with Marín-Sola. I do not think he is necessarily correct, but that’s an argument for a different article.↩︎
Note that I am here distinguishing petitionary prayer from the direct action of the theological virtues. On this, see both the section on prayer in Gardeil’s The True Christian Life and Fenton’s The Theology of Prayer.↩︎
